



The broad issue producing the greatest disagreement concerning the
American Law Institute's Revised Restatement of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States' is the treatment of jurisdictional conflicts between
sovereign nations, where the unilateral imposition of law by one state
directly clashes with the ability of another state to enforce its own laws or
implement its policies over those persons residing within its territory. It is
understandable that this issue should generate contention. It is probably the
most important and perhaps the most difficult of all the issues addressed by
the Reporters.
Part I of this article examines briefly the question of whether the Revised
Restatement is a statement of international law or of United States law. Part
II discusses the Restatement (Second)s treatment of jurisdictional conflicts,
and Part III analyzes the Revised Restatement's provisions with respect to
the same topic, considering in the process the rule of reasonableness, the act
of state doctrine, and the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine.
I. The Revised Restatement: United States Foreign Relations Law or
International Law?
A threshold question is whether there is a difference between United
States foreign relations law and international law. The Restatement
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1. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) (Tent. Drafts
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tentative draft indicated]. The American Law Institute ("ALI") has since prepared two limited
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488 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States claimed that it was
generally stating both, especially as to jurisdiction. z The tentative drafts of
the Revised Restatement generally retain this claim. 3 Consequently, United
States courts have often relied on the Restatement as an accurate articula-
tion of international law, with little apparent awareness of the sharp conflicts
with foreign authorities that the United States position has engendered in a
number of cases.4 This is unfortunate, because even if the Restatement
accurately summarizes the existing state of United States case law, the
awareness that there are serious conflicts between United States law and
principles of international law generally accepted abroad is of major impor-
tance for the proper development of United States law. A common law
system depends for its evolution upon the awareness not the obfuscation, of
such tensions. Unfortunately, both the Restatement (Second) and the Re-
vised Restatement largely obscure this conflict in their treatment of
jurisdiction.
II. The Restatement (Second)'s Approach to Jurisdictional Conflicts
The Restatement (Second)'s approach to conflicting state interests is
essentially contained in Sections 39 and 40. Section 39 says that a state
having jurisdiction to prescribe or enforce is not precluded from doing so
solely because such exercise of jurisdiction requires a person to violate the
law of another state having concurrent jurisdiction. Section 40 says that
national courts should (not "must") exercise their discretion to avoid ad-
judication or enforcement that conflicts with important interests of affected
foreign states if a balance-of-factor analysis leads to the conclusion that the
United States jurisdictional interest is not predominant. The Department of
State and some others appear to believe that the Restatement (Second)'s
largely discretionary approach is an accurate statement of international and
United States law today and that it should be essentially retained in the
Revised Restatement.
5
I disagree. As the Revised Restatement recognizes, the "practice of
states" which they follow "from a sense of legal obligation" is one of the
most important sources of international law. 6 Subject to two exceptions
discussed below, 7 the United States, so far as I have been able to determine,
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Intro. at XII
(1965).
3. REVISED RESTATEMENT (Tent. Draft No. 2(1981)), supra note 1 at Introductory Note to
Part IV, ch. 1, p. 95.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1158, 1162-64 (C.D. Cal.
1983).
5. See, e.g., Address by Davis R. Robinson, Legal Adviser, Department of State, at the New
York City Bar Ass'n (Feb. 14, 1984) (copy on file with author).
6. REVISED RESTATEMENT (Tent. Draft No. 1(1980)) supra note 1, at §102(2), p. 24.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 19 to 23.
VOL. 19, NO. 2
SYMPOSIUM/JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS 489
is the only nation or authority (including the European Economic Commu-
nity) that claims the right to enforce its jurisdiction unilaterally to override,
in peacetime, contrary national laws or fundamental policies of foreign
states concerning conduct taking place wholly or in significant part within
foreign territory.
From the vantage of foreign states and the European Economic Com-
munity, the United States, virtually alone, violates international law in
primarily three areas of adjudication and enforcement: (1) imposing United
States law to override foreign authority within the latter's territory by
claiming a primary right to regulate foreign subsidiaries, branches, and (in
the area of export controls) licensees and goods, based on the ownership or
control by United States nationals or United States parent enterprise (or on
private obligations assumed by foreign licensees in contracts with United
States licensors); 8 (2) imposing United States law to compel the production
of documents or other evidence from within the territory of a foreign nation
without its permission and, recently, fining or punishing persons who fail to
produce such evidence even when commanded by the host sovereign's
government or courts not to do so under penalty of foreign law; 9 and (3)
imposing United States law even where (a) foreign governments come
before United States authorities and represent that the foreign sovereign
takes responsibility for the conduct at issue, (b) those governments declare
that that conduct was undertaken in furtherance of foreign sovereign law or
policy, and (c) a predominant portion of that conduct took place outside of
the United States. "0 The Restatement (Second) has been used from time to
time to justify each of these "illegal" assertions of law by United States
courts, officials of the Executive Branch, and United States regulatory
agencies.
The State Department and some others appear to take the position that
there are few, if any, mutually agreed standards for resolving sovereign
8. See, e.g., Diplomatic Note and Comments of the European Community on the Amend-
ments of 22 June 1982 to the United States Export Administration Regulations (Aug. 12, 1982),
reprinted in A.V. Lowe, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 197-211 (1983); Compagnie Europeene
des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V., No. 82/716 (D.Ct. Neth. Sept. 17, 1982) (trans-
lated into English at 22 Int'l Legal Materials 66 (1983)); Fruehauf v. Massardy, [1968] D.S. Jur.
147, (1965] J.C.P. II 14,274bis (Cour d'Appel, Paris), discussed in Craig, Application of the
Trading with the Enemy Act to Foreign Corporations Owned by Americans: Reflections on
Fruehauf v. Massardy, 83 HARV. L. REV. 579 (1970); Statement by the Honorable Allan J.
MacEachen (then Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs of
Canada) on Extraterritoriality and Proposed Amendments to the Export Administration Act,
to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defense (March
15, 1984).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817 (l1th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 778 (1985).
10. E.g., General Atomic Co. v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 90 F.R.D 290 (S.D. Cal. 1981); United




jurisdictional conflicts in the international community, and, therefore, that
each nation is free to apply and enforce its law to the fullest extent, consis-
tent with fair process, regardless of sovereign conflicts and regardless of the
territorial jurisdictional claims of a foreign sovereign, at least where impor-
tant national interests are at stake. " This view is unsupported by any
significant body of international scholarship outside the United States, and
it is repudiated by the current norms and practices of every other developed
nation under its system of municipal law.' 2 No other nation has sought in
peacetime to enforce regulations like those imposed by the Treasury De-
partment in the Fruehauf case,' 3 or like the United States' Soviet pipeline
regulations. 14 No other nation has, to my knowledge, compelled foreign
discovery in violation of foreign law, even where the subpoena subject acted
in bad faith. No other nation has adjudicated, so far as I have been able to
determine, foreign conduct for which a foreign state takes political responsi-
bility, as the United States did, for example, in the Watchmakers antitrust
case. 15
The proposition that there is a vacuum which permits unbridled unilateral
assertions of jurisdiction might be tenable if the issue were limited to one
state unilaterally regulating conduct as to which other states were indiffer-
ent. Instead, in each of the three areas outlined above,' 6 the issue involves
unilateral conduct having the effect of challenging and undercutting the
authority of a state within its own territory. It is clear everywhere in the
world except the United States that the principle of territoriality, as the
paramount basis for state adjudicatory and enforcement jurisdiction under
international law, confers primary jurisdiction on a sovereign state even
11. See generally supra note 5.
12. See authorities cited supra note 8 and infra note 35.
A good example is the 1979 Swedish Act on Prohibition of Investments in South Africa and
Namibia, Swed. Stat. 1979:487. The Act forbids Swedish companies from directly or indirectly
investing in South African or Namibian companies. The law also prohibits foreign subsidiaries
controlled by Swedish companies from investing in South Africa or Namibia. The legislative
history to the Act invoked the nationality principle to justify the inclusion of controlled foreign
subsidiaries, but was careful to note the limits to that jurisdiction:
In the event of collisions of law, however, the basic principle, according to international law,
must be not to coerce one's own legal subjects, when they are under the territorial jurisdic-
tion of a foreign state, to actions incompatible with the legal system of that state.
Swedish Ministry of Commerce, Prohibition of Investments in South Africa and Namibia 50
(1979). Thus, Swedish law supports the proposition that the controlling general principle is for a
country to refrain from imposing its law to override conflicting foreign legal authority applied to
conduct or persons within the state's territory.
13. Fruehauf v. Massardy, [1968] D.S. Jur. 147, [1965] J.C.P. It 14,274bis (Cour d'Appel,
Paris), discussed in Craig, supra note 8.
14. 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250 (June 24, 1982), amending 15 C.F.R. Pts. 376, 379 & 385, repealed
47 Fed. Reg. 51,858 (Nov. 18, 1982). Nov. 1982, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 864 (1982)
15. United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, 133 F. Supp-. 40 (S.D.N.Y.
1955), 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) §70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), judgment modified, 1965 Trade Cas.
(CCH) §71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
16. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
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where other states have claimed jurisdiction concurrently.1 7 The Restate-
ment (Second) repudiates the supremacy of the territoriality principle and
thus fails to state international law. While the history is not clear, I under-
stand that a panel of foreign experts was assembled to comment upon the
jurisdictional analysis of the Draft Restatement (Second) and that the
panel's report criticized the claim that the draft reflected international law. ' 8
The Restatement (Second) was apparently marred by the failure to ac-
knowledge these dissenting views in the final product. It would be even more
regrettable if the same mistake were made again.
As mentioned above,19 where other nations assert concurrent jurisdiction
over conduct outside their territory (based for example on the nationality
principle), I am aware of only two types of laws in any other state which have
the purpose or effect, in peacetime, of regulating such conduct contrary to
the law of the place where the conduct occurs: (1) foreign political boycott
laws and (2) foreign "blocking" laws. Foreign political boycott laws have
been justified as extraordinary measures during continuing conditions of
belligerency, but the United States has not accepted the validity of these
laws as applied to United States persons and has responded with its own
blocking law to undermine these political boycott laws. 20
Foreign blocking laws are a special exception to the general abhorrence
foreign governments have about applying their laws extraterritorially to
undermine the territorial jurisdiction of the United States or any other
nation. Apart from the United States' blocking statute, 21 every national
blocking law in effect today of which I am aware was explicitly adopted as a
measure of self-protection against the unilateral extraterritorial application
of United States law. 22 In each case, the legislating state viewed some
United States laws, especially antitrust, export control and discovery laws,
17. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 162 (6th ed., Waldock, ed. 1963).
18. See 39 A.L.I. Proc. 315 (1962).
19. See supra text accompanying note 7.
20. The boycott provisions of the Export Administration Act ("EAA") are contained in 50
U.S.C. App. §2407 (1982) (prohibiting, inter alia, United States persons from furnishing to
boycotting countries information concerning the race, religion, sex or national origin of any
other United States person). The implementing regulations are in 15 C.F.R. §369 (1984). When
Congress failed to extend the EAA in 1984, President Reagan claimed that section 203 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA"), 50 U.S.C. §1702 (1982), gave
him the authority to continue the regulations through Executive Order until Congress reautho-
rized the EAA. See Exec. Order No. 12,470,49 Fed. Reg. 13,099 (April 13, 1984); 50 Fed. Reg.
12,513 (Mar. 29, 1985). However, IEEPA only allows the President to regulate or prohibit
certain international commercial transactions that pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to
United States national security, foreign policy or economic interests. 50 U.S.C. §§1701, 1702
(1982). Thus, IEEPA may not provide the President with the statutory authority to continue
those prohibitions in the boycott provisions of the EAA and its regulations that do not involve
commercial transactions.
21. See supra note 20.
22. At least 17 nations, including the United States, have enacted such legislation. Included
in that number is Canada, which just passed the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, Stat.
Canada 1984, ch. 49 (Dec. 21, 1984).
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as a direct infringement of its sovereignty. Although these blocking laws are
in large part territorial, e.g., are aimed at blocking the release of informa-
tion and documents from within the territory of the blocking nation, several
of them at least authorize attempts to override offending United States law
by directing their nationals within the United States (or third states) not to
comply when the blocked United States law is believed to violate interna-
tional law. 23 However, this extraterritorial assertion of blocking jurisdiction
appears to be an expression of principle and of indignation which would
probably not be enforced in the face of contrary orders by United States
courts. Blocking laws are a dramatic expression of the conviction of these
nations that in many adjudications and in many enforcement acts since
World War II, the United States has violated and continues to violate
international law.
Only four national blocking laws were in effect at the time the Restate-
ment (Second) was adopted by the ALl in 1965. The very fact that adoption
of these statutes in the intervening twenty years has more than quadrupled is
strong evidence that the Restatement (Second), in permitting the United
States to exercise so expansive an extraterritorial jurisdiction even where it
conflicts with the policies of the territorial state, did not express inter-
national law then and cannot possibly express international law today.
III. The Revised Restatement's Proposed Approach to
Jurisdictional Conflicts
The Reporters, through the August 15, 1984 Preliminary Draft, have
moved substantially closer to a proper recognition of the views of foreign
legal scholars and authorities as to the international law of jurisdictional
conflicts. They have acknowledged that there are sharp limits to unilateral
assertions of United States jurisdiction where the territorial preference
resides with a conflicting foreign state. They have generally 24 accepted the
validity of the foreign compulsion defense, have called into question the
legality under international law of the regulations applied in Fruehauf2 5 and
in the Soviet pipeline case, 26 and have resisted pressures to narrow the act of
23. See, e.g., Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence Act 1976, § 5(c),
reprinted in A. V. LoWE, supra note 8, at 80.
24. Where the Reporters have not done so fully, as in Section 420, they are perhaps
recognizing recent unfortunate United States lower-court decisions in violation of international
law. However, the law in this area is still evolving and its future direction is not clear. See
generally, Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, Two Cheers for the ALI Restatement's Provisions on
Foreign Discovery, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1075 (1984).
25. Fruehauf v. Massardy [1968] D.S. Jur. 147 [1965] J.C.P. II 14,274bis (Cour d'Appel,
Paris), discussed in Craig, supra note 8.
26. Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Baldrige, 549 F. Supp. 108 (D.D.C. 1982).
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state defense (as some would have it narrowed to require some political acts
of foreign sovereigns within their territory to be subjected to the unilateral
scrutiny of United States courts). However, the introductory note to part
IV, Jurisdiction and Judgments, of the August 15, 1984 Preliminary Draft
fails adequately to convey this deep, omnipresent, serious and probably
increasing gulf between official United States views and those of virtually
every other foreign state concerning national jurisdiction under inter-
national law.
For example, the statement that "attempts by some states-notably the
United States-to prescribe and apply their law on the basis of very broad
conceptions of territoriality ... have created tensions, ' 27 is an understate-
ment. It is not "some states," it is only the United States that weakens
foreign state jurisdictions in applying their national laws to govern their
citizens and those present within their territory. Judges and law clerks who
will use the Revised Restatement should have a clearer idea that the United
States is coming to be viewed abroad as a "rogue elephant" when it so
applies its laws. Furthermore, the Reporters appear to be under consider-
able pressure to erode even these understated recognitions of state practices
and foreign legal authority. For example, I understand that Section 403(3)
of the November 7, 1984 Council Draft provides that "the state with the
lesser basis for jurisdiction in the light of all the relevant factors, Subsection
(2), should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction.", 28 In contrast, the corre-
sponding portion of the August 15, 1984 Preliminary Draft stated that "an
exercise of jurisdiction that is not unreasonable according to the criteria
indicated in Subsection (2) may nevertheless be unreasonable if it requires a
person to take action that would violate a regulation of another state that is
not unreasonable under those criteria. "29 The latest draft thus appears to be
a retreat toward the virtually precatory standard of Section 40 of the Re-
statement (Second). It suggests that courts and prosecutors have relatively
broad discretion, as a matter of international law, not to defer to foreign law
even where that foreign law is applied territorially.
Even apart from the retrogression in the latest draft, however, the Re-
porters go too far when they imply that the rule of reasonableness in Section
403, insofar as it permits "reasonable" law enforcement contrary to the law
or policy of the territorial state, has emerged as a principle of international
law. 30 While it is a considerable advance over the discretionary Restatement
(Second) standard to say that an exercise of jurisdiction on one of the
27. Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at IV-5.
28. Council Draft, supra note 1, at §403(3).
29. Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at §403(3).
30. Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at §403 Comment a. See generally, Meesen, Antitrust
Jurisdiction under Customary International Law, 78 A.J.I.L. 783 (1984).
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otherwise appropriate bases indicated in Section 402 can nonetheless be
unlawful, Section 403 should make clear that such an exercise is unlawful if it
conflicts with the laws and policies of a foreign sovereign which has jurisdic-
tion by territoriality. 31 No other nation has accepted the exercise of ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction under such circumstances.
The Reporters refer to the Federal Republic of Germany and the Com-
mission of the European Economic Community as examples of nations or
authorities that have sought to regulate extraterritorial conduct having an
effect within their jurisdiction and which have thereby had to come to grips
with limiting the exercise of their national jurisdiction to minimize the
intrusion into the concerns of other states. 32 But while those cases did
involve the assertion of "extraterritorial" jurisdiction based on the objective
territorial principle, 33 they did not involve an attempt to exercise jurisdic-
tion so as to govern conduct abroad in conflict with the law or policy of the
place where the conduct occurred. Moreover, there is extensive authority
against the exercise of such jurisdiction, reflected in the norms and practices
of foreign states for centuries through today. One recent source for relevant
state laws and policy declarations expressing these norms and practices is
A. V. Lowe's documentary reference book; 3 4 others are the materials
appended to three annual reports of the International Law Association. 35
31. While the Reporters would not apply their balancing test to override conflicting territo-
rial jurisdiction, the term "reasonable" and the criteria of reasonableness in section 403(2)
draw so much of their content from the eye of the beholder, that the Reporters' reasonableness
does not give sufficient assurance of the reasonableness of United States Executive Department
and judicial officials to justify confidence in its even-handed application. Nevertheless, the
factors set forth in section 403(2) have merit as a set of considerations which can provide a useful
framework for bilateral negotiations between governments to resolve these conflicts (see the
comment of Judge Wilkey at text accompanying note 64, infra). My quarrel is with the
application of those factors unilaterally as a principle of international law where there are
sovereign conflicts.
32. Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at §403 Comment a & Reporters' Note 3.
33. There is in fact some uncertainty as to whether one of those cases, Dyestuffs, is an
exercise of the objective territoriality principle. Although the European Commission based
jurisdiction on that principle, the European Court of Justice affirmed on the ground that the
foreign firm had implemented its practices within the Common Market through controlled
subsidiaries. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd. v. Comm'n, [1971-73 Transfer Binder] CCH Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. 8161, at 8030-31 (EEC C.J. 1972). Moreover, even as a simple application of
extraterritorial jurisdiction, uncomplicated by the conflicts of policies focused on here, these
cases are not very expansive in their jurisdictional reach. Dyestuffs involved the concerted
fixing, outside the Common Market, of prices within the Market. And while another of the
cases, Rothmans, involved an acquisition of stock outside the jurisdiction, the remedy was
limited to banning the acquisition of the West German subsidiary. Dec. of Kammergericht of
July 1, 1983. (Phillip Morris/Rothmans), Kart 16/82, summarized in English in 4 CCH COMM.
MKT. RPTR. §40,571.
34. A.V. LOWE, supra note 8.
35. Int'l Law Ass'n, Report of the Fifty-First Conference 354-416, 565-92 (1964); id.,
Report of the Fifty-Fourth Conference 213-46 (1970); id., Report of the Fifty-Fifth Conference
142-75 (1972).
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The Reporters accept that nation states have an obligation to notify and
consult before applying their national laws in a manner undermining foreign
law. I understand that in the November 7, 1984 Council Draft they cite, too
tersely, as one of the sources for this proposition the 1984 Report of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD")
endorsing such an obligation. 36 While OECD decisions are not binding
intergovernmental agreements, this text was expressly considered and
approved at the Ministerial level by, among others, the United States
Secretary of State. 37 Such an endorsement should and does properly raise
serious expectations of compliance by participants. The Report should
receive fuller explication in the final draft. Most regrettably, the State
Department Legal Adviser now appears to retreat from the position that
there is a legal obligation to notify and consult where conflicts exist. 38 This is
without foundation, as is the view, expressed by some others, that the 1984
OECD Report makes the obligation to notify and consult the only conflict-
resolution obligation generally recognized to be imposed by international
law. By its very terms the OECD Report raises other pertinent expectations
about conflict avoidance in national law enforcement:
In contemplating new legislation, action under existing legislation or other
exercise of jurisdiction which may conflict with the legal requirements or estab-
lished policies of another Member country and lead to conflicting requirements
being imposed on multinational enterprises, the Member countries concerned
should:
i) Have regard to relevant principles of international law;
ii) Endeavour to avoid or minimise such conflicts and the problems to which they
give rise by following an approach of moderation and restraint, respecting and
accommodating the interest of other Member countries;
iii) Take fully into account the sovereignty and legitimate economic, law enforce-
ment and other interests of other Member countries; ....
Member countries should endeavour to promote co-operation as an alternative
to unilateral action to avoid or minimise conflicting requirements and problems
arising therefrom. Member countries should on request consult one another and
endeavour to arrive at mutually acceptable solutions to such problems.
39
Sovereign states must be committed to protecting their sovereignty within
their territory. The United States is committed to that principle, although,
36. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Investment
and Multinational Enterprises: The 1984 Review of the 1976 Declaration and Decisions 26 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as OECD Report], cited in Council Draft, supra note 1.
37. OECD, Press/A (84) 28, 36 (May 18, 1984)
38. Memorandum accompanying letter dated Dec. 4, 1984, to Professor Geoffrey Hazard,
Director ALl, from Davis Robinson, Legal Adviser, Department of State, at I (on file with the
author).
39. See OECD Report, supra note 36, at 26. See also, F. KIRGIS, PRIOR CONSULTATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A STUDY OF STATE PRACTICE 277-358 (1983) (discussing prior-consultation
norms in economic relations between states).
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unlike other nations, it almost never has to deal with foreign laws seeking to
undermine United States law within the United States. When the United
States is faced with such a threat, as with the Arab boycott regulations, it
repudiates their validity under United States law and passes blocking legisla-
tion to frustrate their implementation against United States nationals and
enterprises. If, for example, a court in the Federal Republic of Germany
were to apply German law to force United States subsidiaries or licensees of
German companies to repudiate contracts in the United States that were
consistent with and in furtherance of a United States policy to encourage
voluntary private contracting, and that were enforceable under United
States law, neither the United States Executive Department, nor United
States courts, nor United States citizens would tolerate it-even if German
officials and German courts validated such jurisdiction under a Section 403
analysis. If the United States would not accept the very jurisdictional claims
when turned against it which it has made against others, how can it say that
its claims are supported by international law?
Although Section 403 does not state international law and no foreign
government has applied a balancing test to review, in its domestic courts, the
legality of foreign law or policy, territorially applied, the Reporters make a
strong case that it states United States foreign relations law, based on cases
such as Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America40 and Mannington
Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corporation.41 Notwithstanding the relatively few
criticisms of the Timberlane-Mannington Mills line of cases, such as the
critique by Judge Wilkey in Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 42 the rule of
reasonableness is being adopted and followed in most federal circuits.43
There certainly are problems with the rule of reasonableness as developed
thus far by United States courts. The factors are imprecise and do not always
lead to a clear result. It is true that most United States judges have little
experience in evaluating political and economic policies of a foreign coun-
40. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
41. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
42. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Although Judge Wilkey was critical of application of a
rule of reasonableness in the Laker case, he recognized the appropriateness of examining
reasonableness in other contexts. Id. at 572 n. 169.
43. Balancing has been applied in at least seven circuits other than the District of Columbia
Circuit, and I have found no court of appeals decision, other than Judge Wilkey's, rejecting it.
United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 722 F.2d 657, 658 (11th Cir. 1983), on appealfollowing
remand, 740 F.2d 817 (1 th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 778 (1985); United States v. First
Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341,345 (7th Cir. 1983); Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc.,
661 F.2d 864,896 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982); Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1302 (3d Cir. 1979) (concurring opinion); Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Field, 532
F.2d 404, 407 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); United States v. First Nat'l City
Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968); Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 41
(2d Cir. 1972).
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try. It has been and is likely to continue to be true, much as one would wish
otherwise, that United States courts may frequently intensify foreign rela-
tions conflicts by giving insufficient weight to foreign sovereign interests.
Nonetheless, the courts seem willing to tackle these problems, and denying
the present vitality of the doctrine because it is imperfect is an unsupport-
able rejection of stare decisis. Furthermore, there are instances where the
doctrine has been used in a way which reduces these difficulties.4 4
Even more to the point, the problems with the Timberlane Restatement
reasonableness doctrine would be sharply limited if it were made clear (e.g.,
in Section 403(3)) that reasonableness does not permit a finding of United
States jurisdiction if the acts of a foreign state effecting public policy within
its territory would thereby become subject to possible criticism or override
by United States adjudication, or would be undermined by United States
enforcement. Furthermore, if the relationship between Section 428 (dealing
with the act of state doctrine) and Section 403(3) were made clear and
consistent, with the act of state doctrine properly stated to highlight its full
scope, the Timberlane reasonableness doctrine would become virtually
unobjectionable and hardly, if at all, in conflict with international law and
the traditional competence of United States judges.
Section 428 of the August 15, 1984 Preliminary Draft sets forth the act of
state doctrine as follows:
Subject to § 429, courts in the United States will generally refrain from examining
the validity of an act of a foreign state taken in its sovereign capacity within the
state's own territory.45
Section 429 properly says that the doctrine will not be applied to claims to
expropriate specific property located in the United States. Comment b to
Section 428 says that the act of state doctrine has been applied primarily to
cases involving the taking of private property. These references imply that
the doctrine's primary relevance for the future will continue to be in exprop-
riation cases. It is not until Reporters' Note 1 that the broad and critically
important scope of the defense is identified. Note 1, "Rationale for the
Doctrine," is so important it should be moved up to be an early Comment. It
is excellent in its present form and should not be modified:
Rationale for the doctrine. Several justifications for the act of state doctrine have
been advanced by courts and commentators. Some stress the lack of consent by
foreign states to review of their actions by domestic courts of another state; some
stress the lack of articulable legal standards by which to judge the foreign state's
act; some stress the potential for interference with the conduct of foreign affairs by
the Executive Branch; some suggest that judgment on the validity of acts of
44. See, e.g., Report of Amicus Curiae Stephen J. Pollak to Judge Harold H. Greene, filed
on Feb. 28, 1984 in Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, Civil Action No.
82-3362 (D.D.C.).
45. Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at §428.
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foreign states involves courts in the determination of political questions for which
they lack competence. See § 1, Reporters' Note 1. The act of state doctrine may
also be seen as a counterpart to limitations on a state's jurisdiction to prescribe, §§
402-403, in that it precludes application of forum law to acts as to which the forum
(i.e., the United States) lacks jurisdiction to prescribe or apply its own law,
including (where consensus is absent) its version of international law. 46
Increased economic interdependency among the world's nations, in-
creased economic regulation in some foreign states, and the continuing
extraterritorial application of national law by the United States, virtually
alone among the world's nations, suggest that the act of state doctrine is,
right now, much more relevant and is likely to be increasingly so in the years
ahead in non-expropriation cases of sovereign law and policy conflict.4 7 In
my judgment, the most significant application of the act of state doctrine
since Sabbatino48 has been by the Ninth Circuit (as in Timberlane) in
International Association of Machinists (JAM) v. Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC),49 which is discussed perfunctorily in the
Revised Restatement with an unresolved question that suggests the Report-
ers may have omitted an important part of the decision. ° In JAM v. OPEC,
the court held that where a United States legal action is so insulting to
implicated foreign states, where it so clearly interferes with the efforts of the
political branches of the United States government to seek favorable rela-
tions with those states, and where the granting of any relief would amount to
telling a foreign sovereign how to govern its own people, the action lies
beyond the court's proper adjudicatory and enforcement powers and should
be dismissed.5 1
There is no value in breaking out a separate discussion of antitrust act of
state cases since the same act of state considerations apply to them as to
other types of international commercial cases and since to do so compounds
the erroneous impression that the issues they reflect are less significant for
act of state purposes than those posed in expropriation cases. Furthermore,
the defense is applicable in antitrust cases even when the motives of foreign
governments need not be scrutinized-52 -contrary to the Reporters' state-
ment in the August 15, 1984 Preliminary Draft.53
46. Id. at §428, Reporters' Note 1.
47. See, e.g., Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 723 F.2d 319, (3d
Cir. 1983), cert. granted in part, 53 U.S.L.W. 3702 (U.S. Apr. 2, 1985) (No. 83-2004), discussed
at text accompanying notes 61-63, infra.
48. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
49. 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
50. Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at §428, Reporters' Note 6.
51. IAM v. OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1361. Accord, Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 406 (9th Cir. 1983); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
52. IAM v. OPEC, supra note 49 (act of state doctrine applied even though the motive of the
OPEC states in preserving their natural resources through a price-fixing cartel was not in
dispute).
53. Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at §428, Reporters' Note 10.
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Contrary to the articulation of Section 428 in the current draft, the IAM
case also demonstrates that the doctrine does not just apply to the acts of
foreign sovereigns within their own territory. Rather, it applies to acts,
wherever undertaken, that express the public policy of a sovereign as to
persons or conduct within its territory. While it is true in that case that each
OPEC state passed a law imposing a surcharge on oil pumped within its
territory, those surcharges were only the result of the alleged illegal con-
duct-the conspiracy that all would apply these surcharges at uniform
levels. The acts of conspiracy took place primarily in non-OPEC countries
such as Austria and Switzerland. It makes no sense, as the IAM court
implicitly recognized, to limit the doctrine to territorial acts in complex
non-property cases where conduct at issue usually involves acts in several
jurisdictions. The act of state doctrine applies in the IAM and comparable
cases because each OPEC nation has a paramount claim to regulate the
mining and sale of its natural resources, located within its territory, free
from the extraterritorial interference of foreign national courts. It is for the
United States Executive Branch to act through diplomatic means if this
policy offends vital United States interests.
While there is no recent explicit Supreme Court precedent dealing with
the act of state doctrine in non-expropriation cases, two years before its
decision in Sabbatino the Supreme Court implicitly recognized the broad
scope of the defense in such a case. In Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide
& Carbon Corp., 54 a Canadian official enlisted a piivate company to help his
office purchase and allocate wartime supplies of a rare metal. The plaintiff
claimed to be injured because the private company bought no metal from
the plaintiff. The Court found no act of state defense because of a lack of
evidence that the Canadian government had directed or approved of the
discriminatory buying practices. By implication, if the Government of
Canada had manifested a clear public policy interest in having this private
agent engage in preferential purchases, the doctrine would have applied.
Nor can it have mattered if the Canadian official with the authority to direct
the agent to make discriminatory purchases had communicated the direc-
tion while on a buying trip to Colorado where the metal was mined. The
place of the non-justiciable act is irrelevant to the availability of the defense.
In view of the increasing importance of non-expropriation cases, and the
rejection of a strict requirement that the non-justiciable conduct has taken
place only within that state's territory in the application of the act of state
doctrine in recent non-expropriation cases (a rejection which is also prop-
erly manifested in the rule of reasonableness of Section 403), it would be
more appropriate if Section 428 were restated as follows:
54. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
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Courts in the United States will generally refrain from adjudicating sovereign acts
of a foreign state that effect its public policy within its territory.
In his letter to Louis Henkin, Chief Reporter of the Revised Restatement,
of August 24, 1984, Judge Wilkey refers to an address by a Canadian official
which expresses a Canadian rejection of interest balancing. 56 If United
States courts properly applied the act of state doctrine in cases of sovereign
conflict, Canadian and other foreign objections to the Timberlane standard
probably would be greatly diminished. In cases in which sovereign law or
public policy "merely formed the background to the dispute or in which the
only governmental actions were the neutral application" of foreign laws not
conditioned or undermined by the assertion of United States jurisdiction,5 7
or if foreign governments were largely uninterested in protecting insignifi-
cant policies in situations of minor conflict, application by the United States
courts of a rule of reasonableness would neither violate international law
nor impair the abilities of foreign governments to govern. Under these
circumstances the act of state defense would fail, as in the Mannington Mills
case, and applying the rule of reasonableness would become much more a
traditional conflicts of law analysis in the domain of private international
law, for which national courts are better equipped and have greater experi-
ence than in balancing sovereign interests.
There are two other important points about the act of state defense which
should be amplified, at least in the Reporters' Notes. First, Reporters' Note
3 of the August 15, 1984 Preliminary Draft purports to discuss a definition of
act of state. In fact, the issue that it appears to address is whether a
government can inform a court dispositively of its claim that an act of state
was involved, even as to conduct which appears to the court to be ambig-
uous. The Reporters cite three cases on this issue. In Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,58 the Supreme Court rejected a mere
statement by counsel to the Cuban government at trial as insufficient evi-
dence that Cuba's refusal to pay an alleged debt owing to Dunhill was a
Cuban act of state. In Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,59 and Ricaud v.
American Metal Co., 60 the Supreme Court held that recognition by the
United States of a foreign government as the de jure government of a
foreign state is to be made retroactive in effect, validating all acts of that
government after coming into existence. These cases have little to do with
55. This formulation takes into account the same point made in the November 16, 1983 letter
from the Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association to Louis Henkin (on file
with the author).
56. Letter from Judge Malcolm Wilkey to Louis Henkin, at 4 (Aug. 24, 1984) (on file with
the author). The position was elaborated in April & Fried, Compelling Discovery and Disclo-
sure in Transnational Litigation: A Canadian View, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 961 (1984).
57. Clayco Petroleum v. Occidental Petroleum, 712 F.2d 404, 406 (9th Cir. 1983).
58. 425 U.S, 682 (1976).
59. 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
60. 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
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looking behind the formal representations a government makes to a United
States court about its state actions. None of these cases provides guidance as
to whether foreign governments may establish act of state defenses by
formal written submissions to a court, thereby rendering unreviewable acts
as to which the submissions assert explicitly articulated governmental
policy.
By contrast, a pending case before the Supreme Court, Matsushita Elec-
tric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,6 1 clearly poses this issue. In
Matsushita Electric, the United States Solicitor General filed a brief in
January 1985 this month in support of the petition for certiorari sought by
defendants in the 14-year-old Japanese color television antitrust case. That
brief contended that an explicit and detailed statement by the Japanese
government made to the United States court, asserting that it mandated
conduct by the defendants at issue in the litigation, "should have been given
dispositive weight." 62 The Solicitor General is probably correct that if
United States courts look behind the formal and explicit representations of
foreign governments to determine whether or not they are telling the truth
(i.e., whether those governments' role was indeed as they now characterize
it), they will necessarily be impinging upon the diplomatic process and
challenging the validity of and motivation behind foreign sovereign acts. If
important United States interests are injured by giving conclusive weight to
foreign sovereign statements in any particular case, the United States has an
arsenal of diplomatic measures it can take to seek to protect United States
interests.
Second, many courts and non-experts will need more help than the
current draft of the Revised Restatement provides in understanding the
differences between the act of state and foreign government compulsion
doctrines. This might usefully be made the subject of a separate Section 428
Reporters' Note. In such a note, it would be worth emphasizing that private
citizens, not governments, usually invoke the act of state defense, claiming
that the alleged injury was caused by political acts of the government or
authorized acts of its agents. On the analysis presented above, the defense
applies even if the defendants were not compelled to comply with the
identified governmental policies. Thus, in the pending Matsushita Electric
certiorari petition, even if the Japanese government only authorized the
export pricing agreement among Japanese television firms as a matter of
established policy, but did not compel it, that should be sufficient to main-
tain the act of state defense as to their conduct in Japan. 63
61. 723 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. granted in part, 53 U.S.L.W. 3702 (U.S. Apr. 2,1985)
(No. 83-2004).
62. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 723 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. granted in part, 53 U.S.L.W. 3702
(U.S. Apr. 2, 1985) (No. 83-2004).
63. Of course, such authorization would not legitimate price fixing conduct within the United
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The participation of the Solicitor General in this appeal to further the
application of international law in United States adjudications is appropri-
ate. It has not been done with sufficient frequency in other cases. At the very
least, the Executive Branch should notify United States courts in all cases
where sovereign law or policy conflicts appear to exist that important foreign
governmental and United States foreign relations interests are involved. I
agree with Judge Wilkey when he observes that the Restatement
could perform a real service by emphasizing that each branch of the government-
legislative, executive, and judicial-has an obligation to avoid or resolve con-
flicting jurisdiction by applying its own unique powers. Congress should consider
specifically limiting U.S. jurisdiction in areas where it may conflict with foreign
interests; the Executive must be prepared to negotiate political accommodations
and employ diplomatic channels; and, the courts should be ready to apply conflicts
and comity principles to solve problems which could not be anticipated or dealt
with by the other two branches. 64
I would only add that the courts can perform their role best not by applying
conflicts and comity principles in adjudicating such conflicts, but by properly
applying the act of state doctrine, and doing so early in the litigation
pursuant to motions to dismiss. The purposes behind the act of state defense
are not realized if the defense is only found after full discovery and adjudi-
cation.
The rationale underlying the act of state doctrine as it applies to sovereign
legal conflicts can be expressed as a principle that no state should have its
sovereignty within its territory infringed or nullified by the laws of a foreign
state applied extraterritorially. This principle applies not only to the act of
state doctrine but also to limitations on the foreign sovereign compulsion
doctrine as to foreign discovery (discussed in Section 420 of the Revised
Restatement) and jurisdiction to control foreign subsidiaries of United
States corporations (as discussed in Section 418). To the extent that the
present drafts of those two Sections permit a United States court or law
enforcement agency to require of foreign corporations or individuals resid-
ing in a foreign jurisdiction, especially foreign nationals, a higher duty to
obey United States law than to obey their home or host sovereigns as to
conduct in their home or host territory, they certainly violate international
law, and set a standard that the United States would not tolerate if turned
against its residents.
IV. Conclusion
The rule of reasonableness contained in Section 403 is inconsistent with
international law to the extent it permits United States courts and law
States by such firms since the act of state (wherever undertaken) must relate to the public policy
of the sovereign as to persons or conduct within its territory.
64. Letter from Judge Malcolm Wilkey to Louis Henkin, at 4 (Aug. 24, 1984) (discussing
Section 403) (on file with author).
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enforcement agencies to resolve, unilaterally, public policy conflicts be-
tween the United States and a foreign sovereign state whose ability to
govern within its territory may be undermined if United States jurisdictional
claims are made paramount. However, the rule of reasonableness is estab-
lished as United States law even if in violation of international law, and
United States interests may not be enforced in the face of sovereign jurisdic-
tional conflicts as a matter of United States law, at least without a balancing
test. If, under the rule of reasonableness in Section 403, the paramountcy of
foreign sovereign interests in governing those within their territory is recog-
nized as not subject to being balanced away, and if the act of state doctrine in
Section 428 is properly described, it becomes largely unnecessary for United
States courts to balance competing state interests. That approach in turn
would minimize the conflict between the rule of reasonableness and interna-
tional law.
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